Introduction
The legalized dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been hailed as a new development in international economic relations in which law, more than power, might reign. Nowhere has the international "rule of law" advanced more than in trade law. And yet, such declarations beckon the question of who predominantly uses this legal system, who prevails, and how does it affect bargaining in the system's shadow? Can the legal system work for smaller countries, and, in particular, small developing countries? To what extent has legal capacity--the ability to mobilize legal resources to prepare and litigate a WTO casereplaced the premium provided by market power? What steps could smaller and poorer countries take to mobilize legal resources to participate more effectively? How could changes in the dispute settlement system's rules, or in the application of WTO rules by the system's judicial bodies, facilitate small countries' ability to pursue legal claims? These are the questions, and implicit within them, the challenges, that this paper raises. The paper examines not trade barriers as we conventionally conceive of them, but rather the barriers posed for smaller and poorer WTO members to challenge or even recognize trade barriers in the first place. The WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding created a notable appellate review system which has generated a more complex case law. The texts of WTO panel and Appellate Body decisions deploy sophisticated legal analysis, building on previous WTO jurisprudence as well as some public international law. This case law has burgeoned. WTO members filed 330 complaints in just over ten years (from January 1995-April 2005).
2 Just to read through and understand the growing WTO case law is an immense task, including for specialized academics.
While panel decisions under the GATT typically averaged around a dozen pages, under the WTO they range from 100-500 pages. While the GATT produced an average of 86 pages of panel findings per year from 1986-1995, the WTO produced 693 pages of panel findings in 1999. 3 If one counts the entire judicial reports and not just the sections on "findings," then, in
2000, there were 6,008 pages of WTO panel decisions, which mounts to 7,251 pages when one includes Appellate Body and arbitration decisions concerning implementation periods, compliance measures, and sanctions. 4 The Consultative Board to the WTO Director General reported in December 2004 that the first "81 cases for which reports are adopted, and reports whose adoption is pending, amount to more than 27,000 pages of jurisprudence." 5 In short, WTO economic stakes in the system, the more likely that member will invest in developing and mobilizing legal resources, including through coordinating with its private sector and outside legal counsel.
This paper nonetheless posits that the two explanatory factors do not fully overlap, so that legal capacity has some independent, explanatory value. The relationship of stakes and legal capacity to a country's use of the legal system do not appear to vary smoothly along a continuum. Rather, there appears to be a break at which point there is not so much differences in degree, but differences in kind between WTO members. As an advisor of least-developed countries skeptically observed, "the DSU does not have much relevance to the countries that I advise. It may be the last of their priorities." 8 For our purposes, the term "developing country" does not clearly differentiate between those who are more likely to benefit from the WTO legal system's use. Certain developing countries, such as Brazil, India, and China, may have low per capita income, but they nonetheless can defend their interests in WTO litigation (at least more effectively than others)
because of the scale and scope of their economies. In short, they have relatively high aggregate trading stakes. These aggregate economic stakes spur them to mobilize the requisite legal resources to deploy the legal system, typically through hiring and coordinating with outside legal counsel. Development status, however, also appears to matter. Even relatively small developed countries, such as New Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland, have domestic legal capacity into which they may tap for purposes of WTO dispute settlement and bargaining in its shadow. 9 This study suggests that they are thus better prepared to defend their interests under WTO law than are developing countries with similar aggregate trading stakes. 8 Interview with Esperanza Duran, Director, Agency for International Trade Information & Cooperation (AITIC), Geneva, June 6, 2002. 9 The greater a country's per capita income, the more likely that its constituents have greater per capita economic stakes in international trade law. Moreover, the greater a country's per capita income, the more likely that country will have a more sophisticated domestic legal system.
2. Some Statistics on the System's Use. In recent years, academics have increasingly mined statistics on the use of the WTO dispute settlement system to examine who are the primary participants and which of them are most successful. A number of scholars have examined how "developing countries" have fared compared to "developed countries." These quantitative analyses, however, only tell us so much, in large part because the samples are relatively small, control for the explanatory variables difficult, and most importantly, the samples do not include potential claims that were settled bilaterally, or claims that were neither settled nor filed because litigation costs were too high, expected benefits too low, or the potential complainant was not even aware that it had a legal case. The aim of this paper is to complement our understanding from these quantitative studies with an account built from in-depth interviews with a broad spectrum of public and private actors from around forty countries over a seven year period, as well as observance of the WTO dispute settlement system from visits to the WTO during each of these years.
The statistics show that the United States and EC remain by far the predominant users of the WTO legal system, and thereby are most likely to advance their larger systemic interests through the judicial process and through bargaining in its shadow. Although their proportion of total WTO complaints has somewhat declined in the last few years, they continue to be the system's predominant users. 12 Technically, the United States was not a third party in case DS290 (EC-Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications), but it was a complainant in the similar case that preceded it and which has the same title, DS 174. These percentages have increased, in particular for the EC which has become an even more systematic participant as a third party. See e.g., James Smith, "Inequality in International Trade? Developing Countries and WTO Dispute Settlement," 11:3 REV. OF INT'L POLITICAL ECONOMY 542, 561 (2004) ("Measured as a proportion of their opportunities to appear (i.e. the number of cases in which they are neither complainant nor defendant), the US has taken part as a third party participant in a remarkable 94% of appeals (15 of 16), while the EU has done so in 64% (18 of 28). The next most frequent participant is Japan at a much lower rate of 33 percent (10 of 30), followed by India (7 of 39) and Canada (6 of 34) at 18 percent."). Busch and Reinhardt, more specifically, show that developing countries' relative participation in initiating complaints against developed countries has actually declined.
Reinhardt documented how developing countries "are one-third less likely to file complaints against developed states under the WTO than they were under the post-1989 GATT regime."
24
Developing countries have rather targeted more cases against each other than they did in the past.
The following table presents the number of complaints filed by developing countries, by period and target: Finally, when developing countries have initiated complaints, their complaints have been less likely to result in favorable concessions than have those of developed countries. Importantly, Busch and Reinhardt find (statistically) that "the complainant's income (and, likewise, market size) has no effect on its prospects of winning a judgment, given that one is going to be issued,"
suggesting that there is no statistically apparent political bias in the judicial system itself. however, is much more pronounced in the WTO legal system because the system wields no police powers for enforcement.
In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the law's "shadow" effects include the costs of deploying the law procedurally. As Herbert Kritzer points out regarding domestic litigation, "the ability to impose costs on the opponent and the capability of absorbing costs" affect how the law operates. . Similarly, Indonesia's legal fees in the U.S. and European challenge to its national car program also allegedly rose to around $1,000,000 through the panel stage. Discussion with a lawyer in Geneva, Feb. 7, 2003. However, Indonesia's fees in the auto case allegedly were not paid in full when the Suharto not settled. Each company had hired a major US law firm to represent it so as to provide the respective US and EC trade authorities with maximum assistance to defend their commercial interests.
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At first glance, it would appear that internal legal costs should be the same for all WTO members, rich and poor. However, the internal costs of bringing an individual case can actually be higher for a developing country, unless legal assistance is subsidized. Since developing countries export a narrower array and smaller value of exports, they are less likely to have experience in WTO litigation. They are less likely, in sociolegal terms, to be "repeat players."
Because they do not litigate multiple cases, as do larger countries, they do not benefit from economies of scale when mobilizing resources for a single case. As a result, legal costs in a single case should be higher for a developing country, unless it receives subsidized assistance. In addition, a poor country, whose population may make less than $2 a day, 71 must consider the greater opportunity costs confronting it on account of its scarce resources. Instead of expending money on outside US or European legal counsel, it could focus on other development and social concerns.
Legal expenses have been rising for all WTO members on account of the growing complexity of WTO jurisprudence. Litigation at the international level involves a distant forum in which legal expertise tends to be U.S. and Euro-centric, highly specialized, and expensive.
Complainants can face fees ranging from $300-$600 or more an hour when they hire private law firms to advise and represent them in WTO cases. 72 The WTO Appellate Body's more contextualized, case-specific jurisprudence has increased the demand on lawyer time.
Increasingly, the WTO Appellate Body appears to be requiring higher standards of proof, involving greater use of statistical trade data as opposed to legal presumptions. As a result, the cost of legal expertise has soared. Interestingly, when members of the U.S. Congress expressed concern that Brazil's case could lead other countries to challenge U.S. agricultural subsidies, some analysts responded that there was little to fear. They concluded that the required legal fees would constitute "a sum that is prohibitive for the poor nations that suffer the most harm from cheap subsidized imports." somewhat less balanced result. For them, the optimal remedy package will be one that works well against others but not so well against themselves. This tendency also has to be considered in explaining why WTO remedies are as they are."
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There are three properties of WTO remedies that reduce the incentives for bringing a WTO complaint and which arguably affect developing countries to a greater extent. First, WTO panels word their rulings as general "recommendations," without dictating or providing much guidance as to how to comply with the ruling. To the extent that rulings are relatively ambiguous, they more likely benefit those members with greater bargaining leverage in the negotiations that always follow a legal decision. 77 The prospect of an ambiguous ruling likewise raises the threshold for justifying a complaint's initiation in the first place. Where an ambiguous ruling provides a defendant with more discretion to shape "compliance" so as to retain a protectionist effect, the benefits of bringing the complaint are reduced. Complainants with smaller aggregate trading stakes are again more adversely affected because the threshold of costs is more likely to exceed the reduced benefits in cases of similar per capita importance to their economies.
Second, the primary mechanism for a WTO ruling's enforcement is retaliation by the complainant, a remedy that relies on market power. Large developed countries can more effectively press smaller countries to comply with WTO rules and rulings because access to their large markets is essential to developing country exporters. Smaller countries wield no such clout.
Chad Bown's statistical regressions indeed "suggest that the successful economic resolution to disputes is influenced by the concern for retaliation," which large developed countries are best able to wield. 78 In sum, although the WTO legal system is characterized by procedural legalism, for enforcement, it retains a power-oriented bottom line. The effects of the incentive to drag out litigation have been particularly noted in the use of safeguards. Even though a country may lose a safeguards case, it is able to close its market from imports for almost three years without any consequence. Effectiveness should be measured in terms of the law's impact on party behavior, not in terms of formal legal victories. To truly judge whether these cases were "successful," one should ask whether the cases changed the defendant's behavior toward the use of safeguards, at least against the complaining country.
In domestic legal systems, the creation of rights often precedes the creation of remedies.
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In the WTO context, there may be persuasive reasons to limit remedies, such as the hope of facilitating political settlement of inter-state disputes. 83 Yet a continuing gap between rights and remedies can lead to frustration, especially for smaller members, thereby discouraging countries from participating in the legal system. The gap also reduces the incentives for exporters to help to finance the costs of WTO litigation to facilitate their country's participation. Because these countries participate less, they have less knowledge of the law and are less able to shape it over time. Perhaps most importantly, their relative lack of legal knowledge and their relative lack of strategic influence over the law's interpretation adversely affect their ability to bargain in the law's shadow.
6. Some Conclusions. To understand the operation of the WTO dispute settlement system, analysts need to engage in socio-legal and economic analysis. In particular, analysts need to assess how the legal system's design and jurisprudence affect participation and thus who defines what the law means over time. Analysts likewise need to assess how design and jurisprudential choices shape parties' relative abilities to bargain in the law's shadow, affecting economic outcomes for individual firms and for countries' terms of trade.
As any legal system, the WTO's is far from perfect. It is subject to severe challenges for smaller and poorer members. Yet forsaking such law will not rid the world of systemic disadvantages either. As always, the choice is among imperfect alternatives, including over the design and operation of the judicial system. 84 A world without a legalized dispute settlement system for trade conflicts is beset by greater power imbalances. Critics of the WTO's legalized trade dispute settlement system only need to recall the use of more unilateral mechanisms in the years preceding its creation. WTO law can provide leverage to less powerful countries to ward off the threats of the more powerful. Smaller and poorer countries also need to examine strategies for mobilizing legal resources that do not involve a change in dispute settlement rules. They need to do so since the WTO legal system will likely not be significantly changed and, in any case, lies outside of their control except through their use of it. This crucial issue of cost-effective strategies for mobilizing legal capacity to shape and benefit from WTO law is the subject of a separate paper forthcoming in the World Trade Review. ** The US was the complaining party in a similar case that preceded DS290, which was DS174. If one did not count this case as US did not participate, then the percentage of the US participation would rise to almost 99%.
*** Although they were not joined, the Canadian complainant in WT/DS48 and the US complaint in WT/DS26 concerned the sa were to combine these complaints, then the total number of cases resulting in adopted Panel and/or Appellate Body reports woul and the US participation in 89 of those cases would still amount to 97.8% of the total. 
